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EDITORITAL NOTES
to discriminate against interstate commerce."'" It would be a per-
version of the purpose of the commerce clause to apply the clause
so as to compel the states, in levying taxes, to discriminate against
intrastate commerce and thus subsidize interstate commerce at
the expense of intrastate commerce. The function of the com-
merce clause is to prevent the states from discriminating against
interstate commerce, not to compel the states to discriminate in
.favor of it.
1"
As the Supreme Court said with reference to a state tax on the
met income received from both interstate commerce and intrastate
commerce, so we may say with reference to a state tax levied alike
on all commerce, interstate and intrastate, in oil and gas produced
within the state:14 "Such a tax... .. is but a method of distrib-
uting the cost of government, like a tax upon property, or upon
franchises treated as property; and if there be no discrimination
against interstate commerce, either in the admeasurement of the
tax or in the means adopted for enforcing it, it constitutes one of
the ordinary and general burdens of government, from which per-
sons and corporations otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
states are not exempted by the Federal Constitution because they
happen to be engaged in commerce among the States."
-T. P. H.
INTERPRETATION OF THE WORD "AccmENTAL" IN SECTION 26 or
VEIE WORKMEN'S ComPENsATIoN AcT.-Section 26 of Chapter 15P
of the West Virginia Code provides as follows:
"All employers subject to this act, the state of West Vir-
ginia excepted, who shall not have elected to pay into the
workmen's compensation fund the premiums provided by this
act, or having so elected, shall be in default in the payment
of the same, or not having otherwise complied fully with the
provisions of section twenty-four of this act, shall be liable
to their employees (within the meaning of this act) for dam-
ages suffered by reason of accidental personal injuries sus-
tained in the course of employment caused by the wrongful
act, neglect or default of the employer, or any of the em-
ployer's officers, agents or employees, and also to the personal
12 See Powell, op. cit., 32 HAV. . R m. 902, 917. See also 26 M-av. I. REV.
558, 360.
Is See 25 W. VA. L. QuAR. 222, 224.
U United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, supra, at p. 329. Italics ours.
1
O.: Interpretation of the Word "Accidental" in section 26 of the Work
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1921
WFEST VIRGINIA LAW QUABTERLY
representatives of such employees where death results from
such accidental personal injuries, and in any action by any
such employee or personal representative thereof such defend-
ant shall not avail himself of the following common law de-
fenses: The defense of the fellow-servant rule; the defemse
of the assumption of risk; or the defense of contributory neg-
ligence; and further shall not avail himself of any defense
that the negligence in question was that of some one whose
duties are prescribed by statute."'
The italicized word "accidental" was inserted by an amendment
in 1919. The question is what effect shall be given to that word.
There are several possible interpretations, no one of which is en-
tirely satisfactory.
"Accidental" may mean either unintentional though negligent2
or unintentional and non-negligent.3 If it means the former to
whom is it referable? There are two solutions. First, it may mean
an unintentional, negligently self-inflicted injury by the employee.
The object of such a definition would be to prevent recovery by
the employee for such injuries. There are decisive objections to
this explanation. First, recovery under such circumstances has
been expressly forbidden by another section' of the act itself.
Second, before the amendment it had been stated by the Supreme
Court that the section as it then read would not support an action
where the employee wilfully inflicted injury upon himself." In
view of these objections the only purpose in inserting the word
"accidental" would be, because of an incredible excess of caution,
to make trebly clear that which was already doubly so. Third, and
most conclusive, if the injury were self-inflicted it could not be
2 ACTS OF W. VA., RG. & EXTRAORD. SESS., 1919, 479.
2 See Blue Wing v. Buckner, 51 Ky. 246, 250 (1851) ; Ullman v. Chicago & N.
W. R. Co., 112 Wis. 150, 88 N. W. 41 (1901) ; McCarty v. New York & E. R. Co..
30 Pa. St. 247, 251 (1858); Crutchfield v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 76 N. C. 320,
322 (1877) ; Payne v. Fraternal Accident Assn. of Am., 119 Ia. 342, 93 N. W.
361. 362 (1905). WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY defines -"accidental"
as "that which happens without design." Such a definition does not, of course, ex-
clude negligent injuries. See also, BouviER, LAW DICTIoARY, 3 ed., 101.
1 See Nave v. Flack, 90 Ind. 205, 210 (1883) ; U. S. v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851, 855
(1890) ; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Barnett, 65 Ark. 255, 45 S. W. 550
(1898). "In its proper use the term excludes negligence." BLACK, LAW DXcTIoNASY,
2 ed.. 15.
a W. Va. CoD, C. 15P, § 28, reads as follows: "Notwithstanding anything herein
contained, no employee or dependent of any employee shall be entitled to receive
any sum from the workmen's compensation fund, or to direct compensation from
any employer making the election and receiving permission mentioned in section
fifty-four hereof, or otherwise under the. provisions of this act, on account of any
personal Injury to or death of any employee caused by a self-inflicted injury, the
wilful misconduct, or disobedience to such rules and regulations as may be adopted
by the employer and approved by the commissioner . .... I
1 See Watts v. Ohio Valley Electric R. Co., 78 W. Va. 144, 148, 88 S. E. 659.
661 (1916).
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1921], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol27/iss4/8
EDITORIAL NOTES
"caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of the employer,"
etc.
The other solution is that it refers to the employer. That would
exclude an interpretation that he should be liable, under the pro-
vision of this section, for intentional injuries, but would make him
answerable for his unintentional but negligent acts. A reason
for such a signification would be found in the following lines of
reasoning. Section 28 provides that an employee shall have, in
addition to the rights given him by the act, a remedy in tort
against an employer, under the statute, who has intentionally in-
jured him. Section 26 is concerned with the employee's rights
against an employer not under the act. When the statute was
first enacted, there was the possibility that the court, taking an
exceedingly narrow and backward view of Section 26, might in-
terpret it as merely declaratory of the common law.' The effect of
such an interpretation would be to read in the word "intentional"
before "injuries". The addition of the word "accidental" in the
sense suggested, would exclude such a construction. This would not
mean that an employer not under the act vho intentionally in-
jures his employee would escape liability. The act nowhere abol-
ishes the common-law tort action by an injured employee against
an employer not under the act. It only deprives such an employer,
under certain circumstances, (i. e., under the constructibn con-
tended for, where he was negligent) of the common-law defences
specified. In the case of intentional injuries the employer never
had these defences, therefore there was no need to abolish them by
statute.
This construction, though possible, is improbable. Eight years
ago there might have been some justification for a fear that the
courts might hold the provision which abolished common-law de-
fences to a tort action in derogation of the common law and there-
fore to be strictly construed and allowed to change it only so far as
the words necessarily required. When the amendment in question
was made, however, there was no real foundation for such an ap-
prehension. In 1919 it would have taken the most reactionary of
courts to hold such acts other than remedial and therefore to be
construed liberally in the light of their purpose. But the answer
a See BLACK STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 110. 233, 237; Preliminary Article on
Statutes and Statutory Construction, 1 PEn. STAT. ANN., 2 ed., 122, particularly
cases cited in note 71; 2 LEwis' SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 2 ed.,
§§ 73-5.
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is even more decisive. The West Virginia Supreme Court had
emphatically announced, before the amendment in question was
made, that Section 26 covered negligent injuries caused by the
employer, etc.
7
The other meaning attributable to "accidental", that it covers
non-negligent as well as unintentional injuries, involves some nice.
aes in interpretation of the other words of the section. First, such
a definition logically would exclude liability for negligent acts of
employers. It would be very difficult to believe such construction
is proper. To avoid it, it may be argued that the particular qual-
ification might be construed as additional rather than exclusive be.
cause the restricted interpretation would be opposed to the general
purpose of the act.8
If it is taken as exclusive, a difficulty as to the signification to
be given to "wrongful" arises. The ordinary meaning of the word
is, without doubt, tortious.9 Torts are composed, not only of neg-
ligent and wilful acts which cause injury, but also of non-negli.
gently inflicted injuries based upon the postulate that "in civil.
ized society men must be able to assume that others who maintain
things likely to get out of hand or to escape and do damage, will
restrain them or keep them within their proper bounds."' 1  The
word "accidental" necessarily must limit the word "wrongful";
and it would restrict it to the latter category of torts,-the non.
negligent ones. It would not follow, however, that Section 26
abolished the common-law defenses only as to non-negligently in-
flicted injuries. Such a limited operation may be avoided by a
careful adherence to the exact words of the statute. After stating
(according to the interpretation just worked out) that employers
not under the act shall be liable to their employees for non-negli-
gent personal injuries caused non-negligently by the employer,
etc., the section goes on as follows: "and in any action (not any
such action) by any such employee (referring generally to em.
ployees of employers not under the act) or personal representa-
7 Watts v. Ohio Valley Electric R. Co.. 78 W. Va. 144, 88 S. E. 659 (1916);
Louis v'. Smith-McCormick Const. Co., So W. Va. 159, 92 S. E. 249 (1917);
Roberts v. United Fuel Gas Co.. 84 W. Va. 368, 99 S. E3. 549 (1919). See Do
Francesco v. Piney Mining Co.. 76 W. Va. 757, 761, 86 S. E. 777 (1915); Wllkin
v. H. Koppers Co., 84 W. Va. 460, 100 S. Z. 300, 301 (1919).
& See BLACK, INTERP3ETATIox OF LAWS, 146; 2 LEWIS' SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTIoN, 2 ed., § 491.
* See WRsTs s's NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONAnY, tit., Wrongful; 3 nouvrea,
LAW DICTIONAnY, 3 ed., 3500; BLACk'S LAW DicTIONARY, 2 ed., 1235.
'a POUND, OUTLINE OF A COURSE ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THC 0MMON
LAw, 47.
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tive thereof such defendant (meaning the employers generally
who have not accepted the terms of the act and not just the par-
ticular one who caused an injury by his non-negligent act etc.)
shall not avail himself of the following common law defenses:"
The italics and parenthetical explanations are mine. The net re-
sult of this admittedly finely drawn and careful interpretation is
to make employers liable for non-negligent, tortious injuries for
which they would be liable anyway, without the introduction of
the word "accidental", if the full meaning of the word "wrong-
ful" is given to it-i. e., as covering non-negligent torts. Further,
it is to be noted that, in order to ascribe to the word "accidental"
the meaning of non-negligent, it is necessary to give to the word
"wrongful" just that full definition.
Some reasons, however, exist for such an interpretation. There
is the necessity of giving to the word "accidental" some meaning
consistent with the rest of the section."" A word deliberately
added by amendment cannot be regarded as inserted without pur-
pose.12 Yet, if possible, it should be given a meaning which will
harmonize with other words in the section. Further the purpose
of the whole act and of the particular section lends sanction to
this view. The end sought by workmen's compensation acts is to
place upon the industry in which a person is employed the cost
of the injury received in the course of employment, intentionally
self-inflicted hurts excepted." They are remedial statutes to be
interpreted liberally to further that purpose4' The object of the
particular section under consideration is to aid the main purpose
by compelling employers to come under the act"s The construction
suggested furthers both of these purposes.
II "As early as In Bacon's Abridgment It was said that 'a statute ought, upon
the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or
word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant;' this rule has been repeated in-
numerable times." Washington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, 115 (1879).
See also 2 LEwis' SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 2 ed., 1 380; Preliminary
Article on Statutes and Statutory Construction, 1 F'ED. STAT. ANN., 2 ed., 1 32.
=i See 2 LEWIS' SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 2 ed., 1 401; 1 HON-
NOLD, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 30.
13 See 1 HoNNOLD, WO KM N'S COMENSATION, § 2. See also Wambaugh.
"Workmen's Compensation Acts: Their Theory and Their Constitutionality," 25
HARV. L. REv. 129. 134.
14 See 2 LEWIS' SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 2 ed., If 336, 583-586.
679-684; BLAcK. INTERPRETATION or LAWS, § 117; Preliminary article on Statutes
and Statutory Construction, 1 FED. STAT. ANN., 2 ed.. § 94; 1 HONNOLD, WORK-
USN'S COMPENSATION, 1 6, and cases cited in note 35.
is See BEADBURY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATIOx, 1 20. This method of clubbing
the employers to accept the act by the indirect method of limiting their defences
in tort actions against them was adopted to avoid the possibility that a compul-
sory statute might be held unconstitutional. Such a possibility Is now exceedingly
remote. See Wambaugh, "Workmen's Compensation Acts: Their Theory and Their
Constitutionality," supra; 19 MIcH. L. REV. 31. See also a discussion of the de-
cision upholding the Arizona Workmen's. Compensation Act, 33 HAim. L. Rzv. 86.
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There is one more possible, though unlikely view. It is a sound
rule of construction that wherever a statute is inartificially ex-
pressed and the context throws no clear light on its meaning the
courts are required to look less at the letter or words of a statute
than at the reason and spirit of the law."8 It should, in such a
case, be interpreted functionally.17 In the purpose of the act there
is some justification for a more radical construction which would
make a sweeping change in the law. It is arguable that the word
"accidental" was inserted to enable an employee to recover, in a
tort action, from an employer, not under the act, for those injuries
for which he would receive compensation had his employer elected
to accept the provisions of the law. This would entail one of two
things: either the striking out of the words "caused by. .....
agents or employees", or the reading into the sentence, immediately
after that clause, some such words as "or caused by anything else
happening in the course of and arising out of the employment for
which the employer would be liable if under the act." Such ex-
tensive' s interpretation would give full effect to the purpose of the
statute. It would, however, be giving very far-reaching conse-
quence to a very small change. While the whole policy of the act
warrants such a result, it would seem better to reach it by explicit
enactment than by doubtful interpretation. The legislature should
act to clarify the passage.
Two recent West Virginia cases have been decided under Sec-
tion 26. Both cases held that an employer not under the statute
was liable only for negligent acts, etc., causing injury to the em-
ployee. In neither case, however, was the effect of the word
16 The authoritative common-law canons of statutory construction are laid down
by Blbckstone to this effect. See 1 JONES, BLACESTONE, §§ 68-72. See also,
Preliminary Article on Statutes and Statutory Construction, 1 FED. STAT. AxN.,
2 ed., § 22; 2 LEWIS' SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNSTRucTioN, 2 ed., §§ 363-370,
471.
Vr The traditional mode of interpretation, rooted in the common law, is to look
upon a statute as the declared will of the law-giver like a Byzantine emperor or
a Napoleon. But this playing a judicial Ruth to a legislative Naomi overlooks
the sociological nature of law-making. It ignores the fact that "the law-maker
is the man of his time, thoroughly saturated with the thoughts of his time, thor-
oughly filled with the culture that surrounds him, that he works with the views
and conceptions which are drawn from his sphere of culture ..... The opinion
that the will of the law-maker is controlling in construing legislation is only an
instance of the unhistorical treatment of the facts of the world's history and should
disappear entirely from jurisprudence. Hence the principle: rules of law are not
to be interpreted according to the thought and will of the lawmaker, but they are
to be interpreted sociologically." KOHLEn, LEHRBUCH Dms BURGEuIJCHEN RECHTS,
1, § 38 (Pound's trans.). Therefonre the purpose and effect of the law should dom-
inate in all doubtful interpretations. See Pound, "Courts and Legislation," 9
THE MODERN LrGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES, 202, 225; Kohler, "Judicial Interpretation
of Enacted Law," 9 THE MODERN LEOAL PHLosOPHy SEnirs, 187.
Is Such interpretation is, of course, spurious. Although there is ample authority
for such Judicial legislating it is inadvisable to resort to it. See Pound, "Spurious
Interpretation," 7 Cor. L. Rzy. 379.
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"accidental" discussed. One case"9 arose in 1916, before the
amendment, so the problem was not involved. It is not apparent
when the facts in the other case21 occurred. Inasmuch as the court
used the text of the act in the Code Supplement of 191821 they
probably took place prior to the amendment. At any rate, it seems
clear that the court never had the point before it. The question is,
therefore, still an open one upon which it is desirable that the
legislature express itself clearly.
-G. E. 0.
NUL TIEL CORPORATION A PLEA IN BAR.-At common law, com-
prehensively speaking, all defensive matter is pleaded either (1)
in bar of the action or (2) in abatement or suspension of the action.
Since in West Virginial the "parol" will no longer "demur" on
account of infancy,2 the members of the profession ordinarily speak
only of pleas in bar and pleas in abatement, using the latter term to
cover pleas to the jurisdiction. It is usual to state that defensive
matter which bars the very right of action, and therefore all pos-
sible actions in which the.right might be asserted, should be pleaded
in bar; and that matter which, ignoring the right, merely abates
the particular action to which the plea is filed should be pleaded in
abatement. So far, very well. But a moment of reflection brings
the realization that a right of action may be considered as barred
with reference to any one of three different elements which are al-
ways inherent in every right of action: (1) the right itself; (2) the
party entitled to assert the right; (3) the party against whom it
may be asserted. In other words, it is possible to classify pleas in
bar as (1) those going to the subject matter of the action, and (2)
those going to the person. Whether it is appropriate to do so is an-
other question. On the other hand, a typical plea in abatement
undertakes to interpose a bar with reference to neither the subject
matter nor the person, but merely undertakes to stop the action.
Courts are agreed that matter extinguishing the-right in so far as
it reposes in the subject matter. of the action should be pleaded in
bar. Likewise, it is conceded that matter which will not prevent
10 Miller v. United Fuel Oas Co., 106 S. E. 419 (W. Va. 1921).
0 Zinn v. Cabot, 106 S. E. 427 (W. Va. 1921).
Zinn v. Cabot, supra, 428.
C oDE, c. 125. §13.
2 ANDREWS, ST2 ;EN'S PLWDING, 180L
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